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Individuals and collections of individuals face a wide range of
decisions that involve the choice of spending resources to reduce the
probability of some uncertain and undesirable event. Investments in
locks and police protection to reduce the probability of being burgled,
investments in preventative health measures, expenditures to reduce the
risk of accidents, and expenditures on national defense all fall into
this category. In this paper we shall refer to all decisions of this
type as safety expenditures. The characteristic of these expenditures
is that they involve committing current resources, which can be measured
in dollars, to alter a gamble involving consequences of a partially
nonmonetary nature. The consequences are nonmonetary in the sense that
some attributes of the consequences cannot oe bought and sold in any
market. For example, if you were in an automobile accident, your car
might be ruined and you might be injured and possibly disabled for life.
In this case, you could be compensated for your car, your medical ex-
penses, and possible income lost because of your disability, but there
is no market in which you can buy back your health. It is the latter
aspect of this outcome which we call nonmonetary.
While the nonmonetary aspects of an outcome present an interesting
and vexing valuation problem, decision analysts are quick to point out
that it is irrelevant for most safety decisions. Since such decisions
usually involve determination of how much an individual would be willing
to pay for some small reduction in the probability of an unfavorable
outcome, it is not necessary to know the value of reducing the probability
from one to zero. Although this is true for most purposes, as we show,
it is possible to obtain much more powerful results concerning safety
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decisions if all consequences can be converted to monetary equivalents.
In particular, one can draw strong conclusions about the marginal will-
ingness to pay for increments of safety, as a function of the level of
safety, from the assumption of risk aversion alone in this case.
In the first section of this paper we define the concept of a
wealth equivalent to an outcome with some nonmonetary attributes. We
then demonstrate that, under the assumption that such a wealth equivalent
exists, risk aversion implies that the marginal wi 11 ingness-to-pay for
an increment in safety (measured by the reduction in the probability of
an unfavorable outcome) decreases as the initial probability of an
unfavorable outcome increases. For example, an individual would be
willing to pay less to reduce the probability of being mugged from .40
to .39 than from .10 to .09. This result, which seems counter intuitive,
is shown to have a number of interesting behavioral implications.
Next we examine the relationship between behavior towards risk,
the relative marginal utility of wealth given a favorable as opposed to
unfavorable outcome, and the existence of a wealth equivalent . In
this section we derive a set of sufficient conditions for the existence
of a wealth equivalent to an outcome with some nonmonetary attributes.
2. The Case of Wealth Equivalents
Consider the case of an individual with wealth w who faces a
gamble where he may or may not incur some undesirable consequence, de-
noted by v. Then his utility is a function of his wealth and whether or
not v occurs. Formally, we define his utility by U(w,v) where v is
1 or depending on whether or not v occurs. In addition we assume
-3-
that U(w,v) satisfies the expected utility theorem and is twice
differentiate in w. Finally, we posit that U > 0, U < 0,J
'
v W 'WW
and U(w,l) < U(w,0), i.e, whether or not v occurs, an individual
values increases in wealth and is risk averse, and if v occurs, he is
worse off at all levels of wealth.
Now consider the cost of incurring the undesirable consequences
represented by v. This cost or loss can be unambiguously defined in
terms of wealth if there exists an amount of money L such that
(1) U(w,l) = U(w-L,0),
i.e., the individual is indifferent between a loss of L dollars and
having his initial wealth w and suffering the consequences represented
by v. The amount L is the wealth equivalent of suffering the conse-
quences represented by v. L includes both any direct monetary losses
associated with v such as the value of a demolished car or stolen goods
plus the value the individual places on nonmonetary attributes of v
,
such as pain and anguish. Clearly, L also represents the maximum
amount that an individual would pay to avoid suffering v in a certain
world.
Now suppose an individual has wealth, w , and that there is a
probability p that he will suffer the consequences represented by v.
Using (1), his expected utility is given by
(2) pU(w.l) + (1-p) U(w,0) pU(w-L.O) + (1-p) U(w,0),
and thus for simplicity we can rewrite the equation for the individual's
expected utility as
(3) pU(w-L) + (1-p) U(w).
-4-
We can now define the cost to the individual of a probability of
suffering the consequences v by the equation
(4) U(w-c(p,w,L)) = pU(w-L) + (1-p) U(w).
In equation (4) c(p,w,L) represents the amount one would willingly
pay to eliminate the risk associated with a probability p of a loss
L given wealth w . The derivative of c with respect to p represents
the individual's marginal willingness to pay for reductions in the
probability of incurring the loss of L or equivalently the consequences
of v.
Clearly, c (p,L,w) is positive (this follows directly from the
assumption that U > 0). Further, if we totally differentiate (4)





(w-c(p,L,w)) + (Cpfp.L.wJ^U^Cw-cfp.L.w)) = 0.
From (5) and the previous assumptions that U > and U < , it
2
follows that c (p,L,w) < 0. Therefore, in the case where a wealth
rr
equivalent exists the marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in the
threat of suffering the consequences of v , as measured by p , decreases
as a function of p for a risk-averse individual. For example, what a
risk-averse individual would be willing to pay for a one percentage point
2
Obviously, if we had assumed risk preference (U > 0), the sign
of (5) would be reversed.
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reduction in the probability of being the victim of a crime would be less
3
the higher the crime threat.
Given this result, it is of interest to explore the implications
of risk aversion for the response of the cost function, c , to marginal
changes in L . Clearly, c. > and if we twice differentiate (4) with
respect to L, we obtain
(6) -c, , U (w-c(p,L,w)) + c.2 U (w-c(p,L,w)) = pU (w-L)v
' LL w^ w • it L ww v VK ' '' v ww v '
Rearranging terms we get
(7) C
L L (P- L 'W )
=
Ujw-c(p.L.w))
The sign of the right hand term is not determined by the assumption of
risk aversion alone. Put differently, as the size of the loss, L, increases,
the cost of the threat increases, but the assumption of risk aversion alone
does not imply that the cost increases at a decreasing rate as one might
4
expect.
While risk aversion alone does not leave a strong implication for
the sign of c. , the expression in (6) can be employed to analyze an
extremely interesting problem. Using (6) we can explore the effect on the
cost of the threat, c , of simultaneously changing the nature of undesirable
3
This result is not at all obvious. Becker [1968], in his pioneering
work on the optimal level of law enforcement, assumes as a fundamental
tenet of his model that essentially the opposite is true, namely that
marginal harm from crime rises with the crime rate.
4
Again drawing on the literature on the cost of the threat of
crime, Stigler (1970) asserts that risk aversion implies that the cost
of crime increases at an increasing rate with increases in the size of
loss. As the results above indicate, this is not necessarily true for
the cost of the threat of crime.
-6-
outcome and the probability of occurrence while leaving the expected
value of the equivalent loss, £(L) = p|_, constant. It can be shown
that risk aversion in wealth implies that an increase in p accompanied
by a decrease in L such that pL remains constant reduces the cost of
the threat.
To proceed note that from the assumption that E(L) is constant
it follows that
w % 11 = L + $ o.




U(w-L(p)) - U(w) + Lp U
w
(w-L(p)).
Applying the mean value theorem to the right side of equation (9) and




(w*) - U (w-L(p))]
(10) -4 c(p,L(p);w) =
-TT7 I M \ \\dp VK ' vp/ ' U
w
(w-c(p,L(p),w))
where w-L(p) < w* < w . Risk aversion implies that the numerator on the
right side of (10) is negative. Therefore, for a risk-averse individual
in the case where a wealth equivalent exists, increasing the probability
of an adverse outcome and simultaneously reducing its severity so that
the expected value of the equivalent loss, p|_ , remains constant
reduces the cost of the threat. Thus, policies which reduce the magnitude
of losses even though they may be compensated by a higher incidence of
occurrence will generate a net benefit.
Now consider the effect on the cost of a specific threat of changes
in wealth. Clearly, in most cases the wealth equivalent L will depend
-7-
upon the level of wealth, w , and if we are to consider changes in the
cost of a threat with changes in w , we must specify the cost of the
threat by c(p,L(w),w). Although no general statement can be made concern-
ing the sign of c , two special cases are of interest. If L(w) is a con-
stant as in the case of a fixed monetary loss, then the assumption of
decreasing absolute risk aversion as measured by the Arrow-Pratt coef-
ficient implies that the cost of the threat decreases with increases in
wealth. If, on the other hand, L is a constant proportion of wealth,
then Arrow's hypothesis of increasing relative risk aversion would imply
that the cost of the threat would be an increasing function of wealth.
The discussion of the case where a wealth equivalent exists can be
summarized as follows: If there exists a wealth loss that is equivalent
to the occurrence of a specific undesirable event, then the cost to an
individual of the probability p that this event will occur is identical
to adding to his wealth a random component with probability p of being
-L and probability (1-p) of being with an expected value of
-pL. The cost of adding this random component is
(11) c(p,L,w) = pL + r(p,L,w)
where pL is the expected value of the loss and r(p,L,w) is the cost
of risk bearing. For risk-averse individuals, the value of the function
r is positive.
Since pL is linear in p , it follows from c < that
PP
r < 0, that is, the cost of risk bearing does not increase proportion-
ately as p increases. Similarly, the sign of c. . and r, , will be
the same; however, whether the cost of risk bearing increases at an
increasing or decreasing rate as the size of the loss increases is not
determined by risk aversion alone.
-8-
The important implication of the foregoing analysis is that if the
income effects of the intra-marginal investments in safety are negligible,
then the marginal benefits from a reduction in the threat of harm,





The implication of this is that if, given an initial level of hazard p ,
we choose to reduce p to p-e at a given cost, then we should be
willing to spend more for each successive increment of safety. This
implies that investments in safety should be pushed to some point beyond
which diseconomies of scale occur with regard to reductions in p. If,
for example, one spends ten million to reduce by ten percentage points
the chance of nuclear pollution because the benefits are determined to
exceed the costs, then risk aversion and the assumption that a wealth
equivalent to the effects of such pollution exist implies that the benefits
from a further ten percentage point reduction are even greater and
5therefore would justify a greater expenditure.
Clearly, if the first increment of safety required a substantial
amount of total resources, the income effect could negate this result.
This may be particularly important in the case of national defense.
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3 . Risk Aversion, The Marginal Utility of Wealth, and the Existence
of Wealth Equivalents
It is important to remember that an individual's initial wealth,
w , as defined above, is the discounted value of his expected lifetime
income. Note that this sets a limit on L because w-L cannot drop
below some minimum w which is the level of wealth required to sustain
an individual over his lifetime. For example, suppose that v repre-
sented death and that U(w,v) < U(w,0) , i.e., life at subsistence is
preferable to death with a legacy equal to lifetime wealth. In this
case, the individual would be willing to pay an amount equal to
(w-w) in order to save his life, but if he were able to buy his life
for this amount, this would be strictly preferable to death. Therefore,
there is no feasible reduction in his wealth that is equivalent to death.
In this case we say a wealth equivalent does not exist in the sense just
defined.
This situation raises an interesting question. Specifically,
under what general conditions can it be shown that a wealth equivalent
to the hazard, v , must exist? It is to this point we now turn by
considering the relationships among wealth equivalents, risk aversion,
and the relative magnitudes of the marginal utility of income with and
without the occurrence of v. In particular, we show that the assump-
tions of risk aversion in wealth and U (w,0) > U (w,l) imply
the existence of a wealth equivalent to v.
Because much of most people's wealth is in the form of human
capital, one would need to assume that an individual had a life insur-
ance policy for an amount equal to the discounted value of his lifetime
earnings.
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To proceed, consider an undesirable event or hazard, v , such that
(12) U(w,l) < U(w,0) ,
i.e., an individual would be willing to reduce his income to the minimum
level required to sustain his life rather than incur the event v. We
continue to assume that wealth is valued positively whether or not v
occurs so that
(13) U(0,1) < U(w,l) < U(w,0) < U(w,0) 7
From (12) it follows that there is no loss L such that (w -L,0)
can be substituted for (w,l) and therefore, the cost function c cannot
be defined as in (2). Because the occurrence of v causes greater
disutility than reducing one's wealth to bare subsistence, the individual
in this sense values the avoidance of v more than his wealth, although
because his budget constraint is (w-w), this is the maximum amount that
he would (could) pay to avert v.
It is easy to show that there is some minimum probability, p ,
such that for p, p<p<l , this individual would willingly pay (w-w) to
reduce the probability of v to zero and such that for p < p he would
pay less. We now define a new cost function associated with the threat
of v, c*(p,w), for p , < p < p as before by
(14) U(w-c*(p,w),0) = pU(w,l) + (1-p) U(w,0).
By definition, the range of c*(p,w) is constrained to be less than (w-w)
and for p < p , the individual's marginal willingness to pay for a
If v represented death, then (13) would imply that an
individual would prefer life at subsistance to death and his initial
wealth, but given the prospect of death, would prefer to have a legacy.
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reduction in the threat of v is simply c*(p,w). However, for
p > p , the amounts that an individual would pay to eliminate the
chance of v
,
given probabilities of occurrence of p and p-e are the
same. Nevertheless, it can be shown that, at the same time, the
individual would pay some positive amount to reduce the probability
from 1 to (1-e). The marginal willingness to pay for decrements in p
for p > p is not zero and it is the measure that is relevant to decisions
to invest in safety.
We formalize this willingness to pay by defining the function
m(p,e) as the amount that an individual with wealth, w , facing a
probability p of the occurrence of v would pay to reduce this
probability to p-e . Therefore,
(15) pU(w,l) + (1-p) U(w,0) = (p-e) U(w-m(p,e),l) + (1-p+e) U(w-m(p,e) ,0)
For p < p it is easily shown that
m(p,e) = c*(p,w) - c*(p-e,w).
We now demonstrate that if U (w,l) < U ,(w,0) , then for small e,
w w
m (p,e) > and that for <_ p <^ p , c* (p,w) > 0, i .e. , the marginal
r rr
benefits from a decrease in the probability of v increases with the
level of the threat. On the other hand, if U i( (w,l) > U lf (w,0) 3 then,w w





To demonstrate these results we scale the utility function so that
U(w,l) = and U(w,0) = I. 8 From (15) it follows that
o
This demonstration was suggested by the work of Raiffa [ l 969J
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(16) (1-p) = (p-e) U(w-m(p,e),l) + (1-p+e) U(w-m(p,e),0)
Differentiating both sides of the equation with respect to p and re-
arranging terms, we get
(17) m l z ) = , . 1-[U(w-m(p,eho; - U(w-m(p,e) ,1] ,_^[U V P,E; L(P-e)Uw (w-m(p,e),l) + (l-p+ e )Uw (w-m(p fEy^rr
Therefore, m (p,e) is positive or negative depending on whether
(18) [U(w-m(p,e),0) - U(w-m(p,e) ,1 )]
is less than or greater than 1. Since U(w,0) - U(w,l) = 1 by
construction, it follows that if II (w,0) > II (w,l) , the difference in
w w
(18) will be less than 1 for sufficiently small values of e. Alter-
natively, if U (w,0) < U (w,l) , then the difference in (18) will be
more than or equal to 1. Therefore, m(p,e) is an increasing 'unction
of p if U (w,0) > U (w,l) and a decreasing function of p if this
inequality is reversed.
It is important to re-emphasize that this result is based on
the assumption that no wealth equivalent exists and that individuals are
risk averse in wealth. Under these conditions whether the marginal
benefits from reducing the threat are an increasing or decreasing
function of p depends on the relative magnitude of the marginal utility
of wealth given that v does or does not occur. For example, suppose
v represents death, there is no wealth equivalent to death, and the
marginal utility of wealth to an individual is higher alive than dead,
then the amount he would willingly pay for a decrement in threat of
death would be greater the higher the value of p. This is just the
opposite of the result for the case where there was a wealth equivalent.
-13-
Now by contradiction we can establish that risk aversion and
II (w,0) > U(w,l) imply the existence of a wealth equivalent to the
w w
undesirable consequence v. It has been demonstrated above that given




(w,l) , m (p,e) > 0. We note, moreover,
that m(p,c) = c*(p,w) - c*(p-c,w) for p < p and it is straight-
forward to show that m (p,e) > implies c* (p,w) > . However,
r r r
if we differentiate equation (14) which defines c* twice with respect
to p , we get the result that for p < p, c* (p,w) < . This follows
from risk aversion by exactly the same derivation as in equation (5).
Since there exists some p > such that c* is defined on the domain
[0,p] and since m (p,e) > on the interval [0,p] implies that
c* (w,e) > 0, there is a contradiction. Therefore, the nonexistence
pp '
of a wealth equivalent, risk aversion, and U (w,0) > U (w,l) cannot
w w
all hold simultaneously. Only two of the three can hold. Therefore,
if an individual is risk averse in wealth and if U (w,0) > U (w,l) , it
w w
follows that a wealth equivalent to v must exist.
This conclusion is particularly striking in the previous example
where v is death. For a risk-averse individual with a life insurance
policy equal to his lifetime wealth and for whom the marginal utility of
additional wealth is greater alive than dead, there is some feasible
reduction of his wealth such that faced with death or this wealth re-
duction, he would choose death with a legacy of his present wealth to
life with reduced wealth. Alternatively, if an individual claims that
he does not have a wealth equivalent to death and that the marginal
utility of wealth is greater in life than death, then this individual
must have a preference for risk.
14-
In order to present a straightforward geometric interpretation
of our analysis, we consider a two-state model where the states are
simply v or not v . Given this interpretation U(w,l) and U(w,0)
are the utility function in wealth in states v or not v. The cases











First, U(w,0) is only defined for w > w and this is also true
for most undesirable states represented by v except for death, where
U(w,l) would be defined for w > 0. Second, the existence of a wealth
equivalent means that you take a point on the curve U(w,l), say w* in
Figure 2a, and move toward the vertical axis parallel to the horizontal
axis, then you will intersect U(w,0) at a point (w-L(w*)) > w. Further,
because we have assumed that U(w,0) > U(w,l) , it follows that there is
some interval [w,w] in which no wealth equivalent exists, w may however
be °° , in which case no wealth equivalent to v exists for any value
of w. This is pictured in Figure 2b. It follows from all previous results
that U(w,l) > I) (w,0) on the interval [w,w]
w w
-15-
In the case where w is finite and a wealth equivalent exists
for some values of w , it exists for all values of w > w . Therefore
if there exists a wealth equivalent to v for some value w* of w
,
then a wealth equivalent to w exists for all w > w* . This is
illustrated in Figure 2a. Further, for w > w , U (w,0) > U (w,l) .
4. Summary
The line of analysis above shows that the assumption of risk
aversion when coupled with assumptions about the existence of wealth
equivalents or the relative magnitude of the marginal utility of wealth
in different states has strong and interesting implications for the
structure of utility functions. We have used this structure to analyze
the relationship between the marginal willingness to pay for safety as
a function of the level of safety and have set forth sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of a wealth equivalent to an undesirable event.
As a point of interest, we demonstrated that to assume that a wealth
equivalent to death does not exist, one must also assume either that the
marginal utility of wealth is greater in death than life or that an
individual has a preference for risk.
-16-
REFERENCES
1. Arrow, K. J., Aspects of the Theory of Risk-bearing , Helsinki,
1965.
2. Becker, G. S., "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy, March 1968.
3. Raiffa, H. , Preferences for Multi -Attributed Alternatives
,
MEMORANDUM
RM- 5868- DOT/ RC, RAND, 1969.
4. Stigler, G. S., "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," Journal of





Alexandria, Virginia 22314 12
Office of Naval Research
Department of the Navy
Arlington, Virginia 22217 1
Library (Code 0212)
Naval Postgraduate School
















Cambridge, Mass. 02138 1
Professor S. Ch. Kolm
Cepremap
140-142 rue du Chevaleret
Paris 13e France 1
Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics
Yale University
New Haven, Conn. 06520 1
Professor Agnar Sandmo
Institute of Economics
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Bergen, Norway 1
Professor Robert C. Li nd
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305 10
-18-
No. of copies
Professor Michael K. Block
Department of Operations Research
and Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, Calif. 93940 10
Professor William Giauque
Department of Operations Research
and Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, Calif. 93940 1
Library (Code 55)
Department of Operations Research
and Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, Calif. 93940 2
Professor David Schrady
Department of Operations Research
and Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, Calif. 93940 1
Professor Donald Gaver
Department of Operations Research
and Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School




Stanford, Calif. 94305 1
U160642
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY "^ ..
5 6853 01060601
5
